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Quantum attacks against iterated block ciphers
M. Kaplan∗
Abstract
We study the amplification of security against quantum attacks provided by iteration of block ciphers.
In the classical case, the Meet-in-the-middle attack is a generic attack against those constructions. This
attack reduces the time required to break double iterations to only twice the time it takes to attack a
single block cipher, given that the attacker has access to a large amount of memory. More abstractly, it
shows that security by composition does not achieve exact multiplicative amplification.
We prove here that for quantum adversaries, two iterated ideal block cipher are more difficult to
attack than a single one. We give a quantized version of the Meet-in-the-middle attack and then use the
generalized adversary method to prove that it is optimal. An interesting corollary is that the time-space
product for quantum attacks is very different from what classical attacks allow. This first result seems
to indicate that composition resists better to quantum attacks than to classical ones.
We investigate security amplification by composition further by examining the case of four iterations.
We quantize a recent technique called the dissection attack using the framework of quantum walks.
Surprisingly, this leads to better gains over classical attacks than for double iterations, which seems to
indicate that when the number of iterations grows, the resistance against quantum attacks decreases.
1 Introduction
Quantum information processing has deeply changed the landscape of classical cryptography. In particu-
lar, cryptosystems based on integer factoring and discrete logarithm are known to be completely insecure
against quantum computers. This opened the field of post-quantum (PQ) cryptography, which tries to restore
the security of classical cryptosystems against quantum attacks. Regarding public key cryptography, PQ
cryptography is investigating (or reinvestigating) a number of different approaches such as lattice-based cryp-
tography, code-based cryptography or elliptic curve cryptography. The goal of these different approaches
is to base public key encryption mechanisms on problems that are believed to be hard to solve even for
quantum computers.
The situation in symmetric cryptography is more complicated. It is well known quantum computers can
speed-up certain information processing tasks that are useful for the cryptanalysis of symmetric cryptosys-
tems. This includes exhaustive search [Gro96] or collision finding [Amb07]. In fact, quantum cryptanalysis
is often cited as a motivation to study quantum algorithms [BHT98, AS04, Zha13]. Since these quantum
algorithms usually allow only polynomial speedups, this tends to spread the belief that the security against
quantum adversaries can be restored by increasing the size of private keys.
This short answer to the question of security against quantum attacks leaves aside a number of issues. For
example, it applies to generic attacks and not to cryptographic attacks. Roughly speaking, generic attacks
work against constructions based on ideal functionalities, whereas cryptographic attacks try to attack their
implementations. Attacking realistic, complex cryptosystems may require more effort than just applying
basic quantum algorithms. This situation is well described by Daniel Bernstein [Ber10]:
“Grovers algorithm takes only square-root time compared to a brute-force key search, but this
does not mean that it takes less time than the more sophisticated algorithms used to find hash
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collisions, McEliece error vectors, etc. Sometimes Grover’s idea can be used to speed up the more
sophisticated algorithms, but understanding the extent of the speedup requires careful analysis.”
In this work, we argue that the tools developed to study quantum speedups in complexity theory can be
applied to get new insights in cryptographic settings. In particular, the field of quantum walk algorithms is
a flexible framework to develop search algorithms on complex structures [San08]. Even more interestingly,
the generalized adversary method [HLSˇ07] can be used to prove lower bounds, and thus resistance against
quantum attacks, at least in a black box setting. Applying these tools to study the resistance against
quantum attacks is an extension of the current horizon of PQ cryptography that can be though as quantum
post-quantum cryptography.
We focus here on one of the most fundamental situations in symmetric cryptography: block cipher
encryption. In this setting, a message m is cut into blocks of fixed size, and each block is encrypted using a
permutation specified by a secret key. The original message can then be recovered by applying the inverse
permutation on each block. The specification of the encryption and decryption algorithms are public, only
the key remains secret through the process. Block cipher encryption is widely used in practice. It is also
an important building block in the design of other cryptographic primitives such as message authentication
codes, hash functions, or digital signature.
A block cipher is designed such that applying a permutation specified by an randomly sampled key “looks
like” sampling a random permutation. In this paper, we work at a more abstract level and consider that a
block cipher is a collection of random permutations Fi : [M ] → [M ] where i = 1, . . . , N are the potential
secret keys. The set of permutations is public, and anyone can efficiently compute Fi(X) and F
−1
i (X)
for any X, i. We consider an attacker that knows a few pairs of plaintext with corresponding ciphertexts,
all encrypted with the same key. The goal for the attacker is to extract the secret key that was used for
encryption from the datas.
If the permutations are random, the only attack is to search exhaustively among the keys, which requires
O(N) classical queries to the functions Fi or the inverse functions F
−1
i . Of course, a quantum attacker can
use Grover search algorithm to achieve a quadratic speedup, and find the key with O(
√
N) quantum queries.
In order to restore the same security parameter against a quantum cryptanalyst, it suffices to double the
length of the key. Of course, it is unreasonable to assume that a time bound N is considered secure against
quantum attacks because it is secure against classical attacks. However, the broader question we investigate
here is to amplify the security against quantum attacks. We believe this question remains legitimate.
Although increasing the key length is a neat theoretical answer, it is not always clear how to implement
it in practice. Block ciphers are deterministic algorithms, designed to work with specified parameters N
and M . Assuming that one can double the key size is a strong structural assumption on the design of the
cipher. For example, AES can be used to work with different key sizes, but it was not the case for its ancestor
DES. This block cipher was designed to work with 56 bits keys, and although this was considered sufficient
by the time is was standardized, the question of how to increase this size became central when brute-force
attacks started looking realistic.
The simplest attempt to increase the key size is to compose permutations with independent keys. The
composition of r independent permutations of a block cipher is called an r-encryption. For r = 2, the size
is doubled, but there is a clever attack against this construction [DH77, MH81]. Suppose that an attacker
knows a pair of plaintext-ciphertext (P,C). These satisfy C = Fk2 (Fk1(P )), where (k1, k2) are the keys
used for encryption. Since inverse permutations can be computed, an attacker can construct tables Fk(P )
and F−1k′ (C) for every possible keys k, k
′. Finding a collision Fk1(P ) = F
−1
k2
(C) reveals the keys used for
encryption.
This attack, known as the Meet-in-the-middle attack, shows that it only takes twice more time to attack
double iterations than it takes to attack a single one, where a naive cryptographer would expect a quadratic
increase. Equivalently, the key expansion obtained by double-iteration is only 1 bit, although the size of the
key space has doubled. Of course, this attack is optimal up to a factor two. The Meet-in-the-middle attack
shows that even a simple idea such as security amplification by composition should be carefully studied.
It also has practical consequences, and led to the standardization of triple-DES rather than the insecure
double-DES.
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We address the question of how resistant composition is against quantum adversaries. An obvious quan-
tum attack against the 2-encryption is to use a collision finding algorithm. Finding collisions has been
studied extensively in classical and quantum settings. The series of quantum algorithms for this problem
culminated with Ambainis’ celebrated algorithm [Amb07] for the Element Distinctness problem, which is
optimal with respect to the number of queries to the input [AS04]. In our case, it extracts the keys with
N2/3 quantum queries to the permutations. However, the key extraction problem for double encryption has
more structure than element distinctness and there is no clear indication that this approach is optimal. The
problem has a lot more possible inputs and more queries are allowed. Starting from an instance of element
distinctness and embedding it to an input that is consistant with the structure of key extraction may not
always be possible without a large number of queries to the input. For this reason, there is no obvious way
of proving the optimality of Ambainis’ algorithm for key extraction by reduction from Element Distinctness.
In Section 2, we prove using the generalized adversary method that N2/3 queries are also required
to extract the keys in the case of 2-encryption (Theorem 3). Starting from an adversary matrix for
Element Distinctness, we build an adversary matrix for the new problem (Lemma 1). The underlying idea
is that even if there is no obvious reduction, the two problems are equivalent because they have the same
symmetries. We prove that the attack against 2-encryption that consists in searching for collision is the most
time-efficient, leading to a generic attack deserving to be called the quantum Meet-in-the-middle attack. The
immediate consequence is that for quantum computers, contrary to the classical ones, 2-encryption is harder
to break than a single ideal cipher.
A surprising corollary is that classical and quantum time-space products are very different (Corollary 1).
In the classical case, the Meet-in-the-middle attack is time-efficient for an attacker that is willing to pay with
more space, but the global time-space product is similar to the one achieved by an exhaustive search.
Using quantum algorithms, the time-space product of the optimal algorithm of Ambainis is worse than an
exhaustive search. While this may not be a surprise from the point of view of quantum complexity theory (see
e.g. the conclusion of [BDH+05]), this suggests that the time-space product, a common way of evaluating
classical attacks [DDKS12], may not be the correct figure of merit to evaluate quantum attacks.
The results obtained for two iterations suggest that composition could be a good tool to amplify the
resistance against quantum attacks because it prevents the quadratic speedups allowed by the quantization
of an exhaustive search. We investigate this question further in Section 3, by looking at the case of 4-
encryption. Once again, the tools from quantum complexity theory appear to be very helpful to tackle
this question. We give a quantization of the dissection attack for four encryption recently introduced by
Dinur, Dunkelman, Keller and Shamir [DDKS12]. This attack is essentially a composition of an exhaustive
search with the basic Meet-in-the-middle algorithm. Surprisingly, it is better than previously known classical
attacks solely based on the Meet-in-the-middle technique. Quantum query complexity theory developed good
tools to quantize such compositions, but in order to quantify also time and space complexity, we use the
framework of quantum walks. Our main finding in this case is that the resistance against quantum attacks
decreases when the number of iterations goes from two to four (Theorem 4).
While these tools appear to be very helpful to study two encryptions and four encryptions, we are not in
position to make a statement for general multiple encryptions. Using the generalized adversary method and
quantum walks has been very fruitful for studying Merkle puzzles in a quantum world [BHK+11], in which
these techniques were used to devise attacks and prove their optimality. We present here another important
cryptographic scenario in which these tools can be applied to derive new results. A similarity between the
two scenarios is that polynomial speedups are very insightful. Many specifically quantum techniques are
available to study such speedups and their optimality in black-box settings. Even if the main question
about successive encryption remains open, we hope that our work demonstrates that quantum techniques
can be very interesting for PQ cryptography, and that it will motivate further interactions between quantum
computer scientists and classical cryptographers.
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2 Optimality of the quantum Meet-in-the-middle
In what follows, M and N are two integers of comparable size and [N ] is the set of integers from 1 to N .
We denote S[N ] the set of permutations of [N ]. The space of keys is [N ] and the space of blocks [M ].
We consider problems with inputs given as oracles (or black-boxes). Usually, we consider these inputs as
functions f , and a classical query to the input returns f(x) for some x in the domain of f . In some cases,
we may also consider an input f as a string where fi denotes the result of the classical query i to f . This
notation is convenient in particular when considering adversary matrices whose entries are indexed by inputs
to the problem. In the quantum setting, the only difference is that attacker can make quantum queries to
the input. A brief exposition of the underlying model with the main theorems that we use to derive our
results can be found in Appendix.
The Element Distinctness problem has been extensively studied in quantum query complexity. In par-
ticular, Ambainis’ quantum walk based algorithm [Amb07] is known to be optimal for this problem [AS04].
The recent result of Rosmanis gives the best possible bound with respect to the range of the input func-
tion [Ros14].
Definition 1. The Element Distinctness (ED) problem takes input O : [N ] → [M ] with the promise that
there exists a pair i, j ∈ [N ] such that O(i) = O(j). The problem is to output the pair (i, j).
In this paper, we use the slightly more structured problem known as Claw finding [BHT98].
Definition 2. Given two one-to-one functions F : [N/2] → [M ] and G : [N/2] → [M ], a claw is a pair
x, y ∈ [N ] such that F (x) = G(y). The Claw finding (CF ) problem is, on input F,G to return the pair x, y
given that there is exactly one.
It is easy to prove that CF and ED are equivalent up to constant factors. Given an input O for ED,
an input for CF can be obtained by randomly cutting O into two functions. The probability that the two
colliding elements are splited is 1/2 and running the algorithm for CF a few times on different random cuts
is sufficient to find the collision with high probability. Therefore, upper and lower bounds for ED apply
similarly to CF , up to constant factors.
Theorem 1. For M ≥ N , the quantum query complexity and time complexity of ED and CF are Θ(N2/3).
The most time-efficient algorithm for these problems uses memory O(N2/3).
The goal of this section is to study the problem of extracting keys from the double iteration of a block
cipher. In this context, we assume that the quantum cryptanalyst has implemented the publicly known block
cipher on a quantum computer. He then receives the classical data consisting in couples of plaintext (P ) and
ciphertext (C), all encrypted with the same key. Finally, he uses this datas to extract the secret key with
the help of the quantum computer. We assume that there is only one key that maps P to C. Equivalently,
we can assume that the attacker knows a few pairs (Pi, Ci), all encrypted with the same keys. This ensures
that the key mapping Pi to Ci for all i is unique with very high probability. This can always be simulated by
giving only one pair to the attacker and increasing the size of the blocks. This introduces constant factors in
the complexity analysis, and enforces the permutations to have a product structure, but do not induce any
fundamental change to the security proof given here. Notice that applying this trick implies that M and N
are then not comparable anymore, which is an important fact in Section 3.
Definition 3. The 2-Key Extraction (KEP,C2 ) problem with P,C ∈ [M ] takes input F where F = {F1, . . . , FN}
is a collection of permutations Fi ∈ S[M ] with the promise that there exists a unique couple (k1, k2) such that
Fk2(Fk1 (P )) = C. The goal of the problem is to output the pair (k1, k2).
It is easy to prove that the complexity of the problem is independent of the pair (P,C). An algorithm
for a given pair (P,C) can be easily adapted to solve the problem for another pair (P ′, C′). Let σ be the
permutation that transposes P ′ and P and C′ and C. It suffices to conjugate every permutation of an input
F = {F1, . . . , FN} with σ before running the algorithm for KEP,C2 . When it is clear from the context and
unnecessary for proofs, we drop the exponent and write only KE2.
4
P C
k1 k2
Fk1 Fk2
Figure 1: The 2-encryption problem consists in recovering the keys k1 and k2, given a plaintext P and a
corresponding ciphertext C
The next theorem shows an upper bound on the complexity of KE2. The idea is simply to reduce KE2
to CF .
Theorem 2. There exists a quantum algorithm that solves KE2 in time O(N
2/3) using memory O(N2/3).
Proof. Assume that F = {F1, . . . , FN} is an input of KEP,C2 . We construct the following input to CF : a
pair of functions G1, G2 : [N ] → [M ], defined by G1(x) = Fx(P ) and G2(y) = F−1y (C). Suppose that the
algorithm for CF returns a pair (x∗, y∗). This implies that it is the unique pair such that Fx∗(P ) = F−1y∗ (C),
leading to Fy∗(Fx∗(P )) = C. It is therefore the pair of keys used to encrypt P .
We also prove the following lower bound on the problem.
Theorem 3. A quantum algorithm that solves KE2 needs Ω(N
2/3) quantum queries to the input F =
{F1, . . . , FN}, including queries to inverse permutations, except with vanishing probabilities.
A lower bound on query complexity translates into a lower bound on time complexity. Therefore, com-
bining the upper and lower bounds on time complexity with the upper bound on memory gives the following
corollary.
Corollary 1. The most time-efficient attack on KE2 has time-space product O(N
4/3).
Notice that a simple Grover search leads to time O(N) with logarithmic space, thus having a time-space
product of N , better than the best known algorithm for CF .
The rest of the section is now devoted to proving the lower bound on the attack. There are two important
differences between CF and KE2:
• It is possible to query a permutation Fi on any input X ∈ [M ].
• It is possible to query inverse permutations F−1i .
These differences imply that there is no obvious query-preserving reduction from CF to KE2. One
important issue is that, since Fi is a permutation, querying Fi(X) with X 6= P gives information on Fi(P ).
Intuitively, we believe this information is so small that it may not be useful to solve the problem. This is
even more problematic in the quantum setting, where a single query can be made in superposition of all the
inputs, preventing the strategy that consists in building the reduction on the fly, when the queries to the
input are done. To overcome this issue, we use a specific tool from quantum query complexity known as the
generalized adversary method.
We prove a slightly stronger lower bound result by considering the decision version of KE2. In this case,
the problem is to determine if there exists keys k1, k2 such that C = Fk2(Fk1(P )). We denote this version
d−KE2. Of course, an algorithm for the search version can easily be transformed into an algorithm for the
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decision version. Consequentely, a lower bound for the decision version is also a lower bound on the search
problem. We compare this algorithm with the decision version of claw finding, denoted d−CF . The bounds
given in Theorem 1 apply equivalently to the decision version of these problems.
The proof of Theorem 3 is in two steps. In Lemma 1, we prove a lower bound in the worst-case quantum
query complexity using the generalized adversarymethod. In the second step, which is the proof of Theorem 3,
we use a self-reducibility argument to prove that the probability of solving the problem on a random input
with less queries than in the worst case is vanishing.
Lemma 1. A quantum algorithm that solves d−KE2 needs Ω(N2/3) quantum queries to the input F =
{F1, . . . , FN}, including queries to inverse permutations.
Proof. We consider an optimal adversary matrix for d−CF and use it to build an explicit adversary matrix
for d−KE2. Details on the adversary method can be found in the Appendix. In this proof, we need the fact
that the generalized adversary method gives optimal lower bounds on quantum query complexity. Therefore,
we can choose an adversary matrix for CF such that the adversary value given by this matrix is exactly
the quantum query complexity of the function. Let ΓCF be this adversary matrix for d−CF . The rows and
columns of ΓCF are indexed by inputs to the problem, that is, pairs of function G1, G2.
We now construct an adversary matrix ΓKE2 for the problem d−KEP,C2 . The rows and columns of ΓKE2
are indexed by collections of permutations F = {F1, . . . FN}. Given a row u, (resp. a column v), denote
u(P,C) the row (resp. v(P,C) the column) of ΓCF corresponding to functions G1, G2 defined by G1(k) = Fk(P )
and G2(k) = F
−1
k (C). The input u
(P,C) for the problem d−CF is called the projection of the input u for
the problem d−KE2. This operation is represented on figure 2. We simply define the entries of ΓKE2 by
ΓKE2 [u, v] = ΓCF [u
(P,C), v(P,C)]. Our goal is now to apply Theorem 6. In order to apply it, we need to
compute the values of ‖ ΓKE2 ‖ and maxq ‖ ΓKE2 • ∆q ‖, where “•” denotes the entry-wise product of
matrices1.
This definition implies that ΓKE2 has a simple tensor product structure. Notice that for two pairs (u, v)
and (u′, v′) of inputs of d−KE2 projecting onto the same pair of inputs (u˜, v˜) of CF , we get by definition
ΓKE2 [u, v] = ΓKE2 [u
′, v′] = ΓCF [u˜, v˜]. Moreover, the number of inputs to d−KE2 projecting onto the same
of d−CF is a constant. Denoting this constant D and JD×D the all-one matrix of dimension D, we get
ΓKE2 = ΓCF ⊗ JD×D. This immediately gives the relation
‖ ΓKE2 ‖= D ‖ ΓCF ‖ .
The next step is to bound maxi ‖ ΓKE2 •∆i ‖ where ∆i[u, v] = 0 if ui = vi, and 1 otherwise. A query to
an input to d−KE2 is a triplet (x, k, b) where x ∈ [M ], k ∈ [N ] and b ∈ {−1, 1} indicates if the query is to a
permutation or to its inverse. The query thus returns F bk (x).
We show that it is sufficient to consider a special set of queries. The set of queries I consists of queries
q = (x, k, b) where x = P if b = 1 and x = C if b = −1. We prove that if the value ‖ ΓKE2 •∆q ‖ is not
maximized by a query from I, it is possible to find another matrix with both the same norm and the same
tensor product structure such that ‖ Γ′ • ∆q ‖ is maximized by a query from I. Formally, we prove the
following claim.
Claim: There exists a permutation of rows and columns of ΓKE2 leading to a matrix Γ
′ such that Γ′ =
Γ′CF ⊗ JD×D, where Γ′CF is obtained by permuting the rows and columns of ΓCF and maxq ‖ ΓKE2 •∆q ‖ =
maxq∈I ‖ Γ′ •∆q ‖.
We first explain how to finish the proof assuming this claim. A query q ∈ I projects onto a query q˜
to inputs of d−CF . Formally, for a query q ∈ I, there exists a query q˜ to inputs of d−CF such that for
any input u of d−KE2, uq = u(P,C)q˜ . If q = (x, k, b) ∈ I, the query q˜ = (k, b) on u(P,C) returns G1(k) if
b = 1 and G2(k) if b = −1. By definition of u(P,C), we have G1(k) = Fk(P ) and G2(k) = F−1k (C) and thus,
uq = u
(P,C)
q˜ . This implies that for q ∈ I, (Γ′ • ∆q)[u, v] = (Γ′CF • ∆q˜)[u(P,C), v(P,C)]. The tensor product
structure ensures that Γ′ •∆q = (Γ′CF ⊗ JD×D) •∆q = (Γ′CF •∆q˜)⊗ JD×D, and thus
1This product is usually denoted ◦, we use here a different notation to avoid confusion with the composition of permutations
that is also used in this proof
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max
q
‖ ΓKE2 •∆i ‖ = max
q∈I
‖ Γ′ •∆q ‖ = Dmax
q˜
‖ Γ′CF •∆q˜ ‖ .
The last equality is true because since I and queries to inputs of d−CF have the same cardinality, they
are in one-to-one correspondance. Maximizing over queries to I is therefore equivalent to maximizing over
queries to inputs to d−CF . Finally, this shows that the quantum query complexity of KE2 is at least
min
q
‖ ΓKE2 ‖
‖ ΓKE2 •∆q ‖
= min
q
‖ Γ′ ‖
‖ Γ′ •∆q ‖ = minq˜
D ‖ Γ′CF ‖
D ‖ Γ′CF •∆q˜ ‖
= min
q˜
‖ ΓCF ‖
‖ ΓCF •∆q˜ ‖ = Ω(N
2/3).
X
k
Fk
FN
FN
P
Fk(X)
F1(X)
FN (X)
G1(k)
G1(1)
G1(N)
Figure 2: An input to KE2 can be represented as a table whose rows and columns are indexed by k and X ,
respectively. Each line of the table is a permutation Fi. The projecting onto an input to CF is a restriction
to one column. To build a complete input to CF , one also has to restrict the table of permutations F−1k .
It only remains to prove the above claim. Suppose that ‖ ΓKE2 • ∆q ‖ is maximized by a query q∗ =
(x∗, k∗, b∗). The intuition of the claim is that if q∗ /∈ I, it can still be projected onto a query to inputs of
d−CF . By mapping these to inputs of the original problems, we get the new matrix Γ′.
Assume that b∗ = 1 and x∗ 6= P (the proof is similar with b∗ = −1). Let σ denote the transposition
(x∗ P ). For an input u = {Fi}i∈[N ], denote uσ = {Fi ◦ σ}i∈[N ] and define Γ′ as Γ′[u, v] = ΓKE2 [uσ, vσ]. The
operation u 7→ uσ corresponds to a permutations of rows and columns of ΓKE2 . Denote Πσ this permutation,
so that Γ′ = Π†σΓKE2Πσ. Similarly, we have Π
†
σ∆q∗Πσ = ∆q∗∗ , where q
∗∗ = (P, k∗, b∗).
Finally, we show that Γ′ = Γ′CF⊗JD×D for some matrix Γ′CF . The sets {u(P,C)}u and {u(x
∗,C)}u are equal
and therefore, there exists a bijection τ sending u(P,C) to u(x,C). This bijection satisfies (uσ)(P,C) = τ(u(P,C)).
The matrix Γ′CF is simply defined as Γ
′
CF [u˜, v˜] = ΓCF [τ(u˜), τ(v˜)]. This gives
Γ′[u, v] = ΓKE2 [u
σ, vσ] = ΓCF [(u
σ)(P,C), (vσ)(P,C)],
= ΓCF [τ(u
(P,C)), τ(u(P,C))] = Γ′CF [u
(P,C), v(P,C)].
This immediately leads to Γ′ = Γ′CF ⊗ JD×D, and finishes the proof of the claim.
Proof of Theorem 3. We now show that the lower bound proved in Lemma 1 holds on random inputs, except
with vanishing probability. The proof is in three steps. In the first step, we prove that the lower bound holds
for the average number of queries made by the attack. In the second step, we show that the lower bound also
holds when considering the average error. Finally, we show that the lower bound hold for random inputs,
except with vanishing probability.
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Step 1: Let A be an attack such that, given an input F = {F1, . . . , FN} to KEP,C2 , returns (k1, k2) such
that Fk2(Fk1 (P )) = C after q queries on average over the inputs and is successful with probability at least
1 − ε for any input. Consider then the following attack: run A for q/ε queries. If A stopped, then output
the same value. Otherwise output a random value. By Markov’s inequality, this new attach is successful
with probability at least 1− 2ε and therefore, by Lemma 1, q/ε ≥ Ω(N2/3).
Step 2: Let A′ be an attack such that, given an input F = {F1, . . . , Ft} to KEP,C2 , returns (k1, k2) such
that Fk2(Fk1 (P )) = C after q queries on average and is successful with average probability 1− ε, both over
the inputs. Consider now the following attack: Choose N random permutations {σ1, . . . σN}, and run the
A′ on the input F ′ = {σ1 ◦ F1, . . . , σN ◦ FN}. This is equivalent to running A′ on a random input, so that
the error made by the attack is now 1− ε for any input. From Step 1, we get again q = Ω(N2/3).
Step 3: Let A′′ be an attack that solves KEP,C2 with error ε on average. Denote Q the random variable
indicating the number of queries made by A′′ and fix q = o(N2/3). Denote δ = Pr[Q ≤ q]. We want to
prove that δ is vanishing. Fix two constants k and k′ and consider the following attack. Repeat k/δ times
the following steps:
1. Choose N random permutation σ1, . . . , σN . Run A′′ on a random input as explained in Step 2, and
stop it after k′q queries.
2. If A′′ stopped, then output the same value and stop.
If after repeating these two steps k/δ times, no output was produced, output random values.
The number of queries of this attack is at most kk′q/δ. Choosing k and k′ large enough, the probability
that at least one iteration of the loop is successful can be made arbitrarily close to one, so that the error
probability of this attack is arbitrarily close to ε. We have constructed an attack that makes O(q/δ) queries
on average and is successful with average probability 1− ε. From Step 2, we get that q/δ = Ω(N2/3), which
implies δ = o(1).
In order to measure the gains obtained by quantum algorithms, we use a quantity similar to the one
used by Dinur, Dunkelman, Keller and Shamir [DDKS12]. We consider logC/ logQ, where C is a classical
complexity measure and Q is its quantum counterpart. Intuitively, this corresponds to the factor by which
the key size is decreased when the attack is quantized. For example the gain in time for Grover search over
classical exhaustive search is 2. The gain for the time-space product is similar because both Grover and
exhaustive search require only constant space.
The gain for the Meet-in-the-middle attack is very different. The gain in time is 3/2, using the algorithm
presented above. Since this algorithm is optimal, it is the largest possible gain. The gain for the time-space
product of this algorithm is also 3/2. Interestingly, there exists other algorithms for ED leading to different
gains. For example, the algorithm based on amplitude amplification of [BDH+05] leads to a gain in time of
4/3 (over the classical Meet-in-the-middle attack), and a gain in time-space product of 8/5, better than the
most time-efficient attack. The most time-efficient algorithm is not the one leading to the most important
gain in time-space, and an attacker that is willing to pay with more time can save on the time-space product.
Time Time-space
Exhaustive search 2 2
MITM 3/2 = 1.5 3/2 = 1.5
Amplitude amplification [BDH+05] 4/3 ≃ 1.3 8/5 = 1.6
Table 1: Gains of attacks against 4-encryption
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3 Quantum attack against 4-encryption
We now apply tools from quantum complexity theory to study the case of four iterated encryptions. We
assume again that the attacker knows sufficiently many pairs (Pi, Ci) of plaintextcipher-text in order to
ensure that, with very high probability, there is only one quadruple of keys (k1, k2, k3, k4) that satisfies the
relations Ci = Ek4(Ek3 (Ek2(Ek1(Pi)))) for all i.
The classical Meet-in-the-middle attack can be applied in this situation by considering the pairs (k1, k2)
and (k2, k3) as single keys. This requires time and memory O(N
2), and thus time-space product O(N4).
This was the best known algorithm the recent dissection attack [DDKS12], which still requires time O(N2)
but memory only O(N). This significantly improves the time-space product to O(N3).
The basic idea of the dissection attack is to make an exhaustive search of the intermediate value after
two encryptions. The candidate values are then checked using a Meet-in-the-middle procedure. A notable
difference with the previous case is that the complexity of the problem is now a function of both M and N .
We assumed in the beginning that M and N were of comparable sizes. In order to keep this assumption, we
cannot assume anymore that the attacker has a single pair of datas. Instead, we assume that it has enough
pairs, all encrypted with the same datas, to be sure that, with large probability, there is only one quadruple of
keys consistant with all the datas. It can be shown that four pairs of plaintext with corresponding ciphertext.
Definition 4. The 4-Key Extraction (KEP,C4 ) problem with P = (P1, P2, P3, P4), C = (C1, C2, C3, C4) ∈
[M ]4 takes input F where F = {F1, . . . , FN} is a collection of permutations of [M ]. The goal of the problem
is to output (k1, k2, k3, k4) such that Fk4(Fk3 (Fk2(Fk1 (Pi)))) = Ci for all i.
The attack uses the quantum Meet-in-the-middle algorithm presented in the previous section as a subrou-
tine. The basic idea is to compose this algorithm with a Grover search of the value in the middle. Quantum
query complexity has the remarkable property, derived from the generalized adversary method, that for
compatible functions f and g, Q(f(g(x1), . . . , g(xn))) = O(Q(f)Q(g)) [HLSˇ07].
For simplicity, consider first the decision version of the problem. Given permutations F = {F1, . . . , FN}
and a pair (P,C), the problem d−KE4 is to decide if there exists a 4-tuple of keys (k1, k2, k3, k4) such that
C = Fk4(Fk3 (Fk2(Fk1 (P )))).
Consider the following functions:
fX : (S[M ])N → {0, 1}
{F1, . . . , FN} 7→
{
1 if there exists k1 and k2 such that Fk2(Fk1 (P )) = X ,
0 otherwise;
and
gX : (S[M ])N → {0, 1}
{F1, . . . , FN} 7→
{
1 if there exists k1 and k2 such that Fk2(Fk1 (X)) = C,
0 otherwise.
The function fX returns the boolean answer of the problem d−KE(P,X)2 and gX the answer of d−KE(X,C)2 .
Finally, denote SEARCH the function that, on input u ∈ {0, 1}M , returns 1 if there exists i such that ui = 1
and 0 otherwise.
The problem d−KE4 : (S[M ])N → {0, 1} can be expressed as the following composition:
d−KE4 = SEARCH ◦ (f0 ∧ g0, f1 ∧ g1, . . . , fN ∧ gN ). (1)
It is well known that a quantum query complexity is multiplicative under function composition [HLSˇ07],
which leads to a O(M1/2N2/3) upper bound on the number of queries needed to solve the problem. However,
the composition theorem that proves this upper bound holds for quantum query complexity, whereas we are
interested here in bounding the time and space used by a quantum algorithm. For this purpose, we give an
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explicit composed algorithm. This algorithm is a quantized version of the Dissect2(4, 1) algorithm of Dinur,
Dunkleman, Keller and Shamir [DDKS12]. In the classical setting, this algorithm achieves the best known
time-space product for 4-encryption. We now remove the assumption that the key is unique, and suppose
that the attacker has four pairs (Pi, Ci). We also assume that M and N are of comparable sizes and state
our result as a function of N .
Theorem 4. There exists a quantum algorithm that solves KE4 in time O(N
7/6) and using memory
O(N2/3). The time-space product for this attack is O(N11/6).
Proof. Assume that the attacker knows the pairs (Pi, Ci)i=1..4. This is sufficient to ensure that only a single
quadruple of keys is consistent with the datas. We devise a search algorithm that consists in a composition
of a Grover search with a quantum Meet-in-the-middle attack presented in Section 2. We use the framework
of quantum walks in order to compose these two procedures. The details of the theorems that we use are
given in the Appendix.
The walk is designed on the complete graph, whose vertices are indexed by elements from [M ] who are
candidates for the value X after two encryptions. Once the correct value for X is found, it suffices to make
O(N2/3) queries to the input in order to find the keys, using some of the datas (Pi, Ci). This correct value
is unique, and the goal of the quantum walk is to find it.
Theorem 5 given in the Appendix states that the cost to find the correct value X is upper bounded by
S+ 1√
ε
( 1√
δ
U+ C), where
• S is the cost for setting up a quantum register in a state that corresponds to the stationary of the
classical random walk on the graph distribution
• U is the cost of moving from one node to an adjacent one,
• C is the cost of checking if the value X is the correct one,
• ε is the probability of finding the correct value X , and
• δ is the eigenvalue gap for the complete graph.
In our case, the setup is to build a uniform superposition of all states |X〉, which can be made with
no query to the input, and constant time. The update is the same procedure. The checking consists in
running a quantum Meet-in-the-middle attack several times in order to check that the value X satisfies
Ek2(Ek1 (Pi)) = X and Ek4 (Ek3(X)) = Ci for all i for some value k1, k2, k3, k4. The probability of finding
the correct value is ε = 1/M . Finally, the eigenvalue gap for the complete graph is δ = 1 − 1M−1 . Overall,
this leads to an attack that makes O(M1/2N2/3) queries, and takes the same amount of time. Moreover,
the checking procedure is the only procedure using non-constant memory. The attack uses in total O(N2/3)
memory, leading to a time-space product bounded by O(M1/2N4/3).
P C
k1 k2 k3 k4
Fk1 Fk2 Fk3 Fk4
X
Figure 3: The attack on 4-encryption is an exhaustive search over the central value X combined with a
MITM algorithm to check the consistency with the datas P,C
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Our approach does not give any lower bound on the number of queries to the input. Since our attack is a
composition of Grover’s algorithm with a quantum Meet-in-the-middle attack, expressing the problem as a
composition could allow to apply product theorems on the adversary method [HLSˇ07, LMR+11, BHK+11],
leading to a lower bound. Unfortunately, known theorems do not apply to the composition given in Equa-
tion 1. For example, the composition theorem proven by Høyer, Lee and Sˇpalek requires the inner function
to be boolean and to act on independent inputs. In our case, all the inner functions act on the same input.
Equivalently, the expression given in Equation 1 could be completed with a non-boolean function that maps
the input to N copies of it. The hypothesis of the composition theorem used to prove security of Merkle
puzzles in a quantum world are very contrived an do not apply here [BHK+11].
We compare three different attacks against 4-encryption:
• exhaustive search over the whole key-space,
• classical and quantum Meet-in-the-middle attack where both the first and the second pair of keys are
treated as single keys,
• the dissection attack and its quantized version.
The quantization of exhaustive search gives a very good gain, but its time-performance is poor. Applying
the Meet-in-the-middle attack from the previous section gives both poor gains and poor performances. The
quantization of the dissection attack gives better gains than what we observed for 2-encryption, but we have
no indications that this algorithm is optimal.
Time Time-space
Exhaustive search 2 2
MITM 3/2 = 1.5 3/2 = 1.5
Dissection 12/7 ≃ 1.7 18/11 ≃ 1.63
Table 2: Gains of attacks against 4-encryption
4 Conclusion
Iterative encryption is a natural way to amplify the security of block ciphers. It is well known that this
procedure do not lead to the expected results, even for classical attacks in the case of 2-encryption. The
Meet-in-the-middle attack allows an attacker to save a lot of time, if he is willing to pay with more space.
Equipped with a quantum computer, an attacker can run a quantum algorithm for collision finding. We
have proven that this approach leads to optimal time complexity for extracting keys, making crucial use of
the generalized adversary method, a tool from quantum complexity theory. Extracting a pair of keys (k1, k2)
takes time N2/3, where N is the size of the key space of a single encryption. An interesting corollary is that
the most time-efficient attack is not known to give the best gain for time-space product. An attacker can
pay with more time and save on space, but with a ratio that differs fundamentally from the classical case.
We have then studied the case of 4-encryption, for which we have given a quantized version of the
dissection attack of Dinur, Dunkleman, Keller and Shamir. This quantization uses the framework of quantum
walks, another important concept of quantum algorithms and complexity theory. We do not not know if
this quantum attack is optimal with respect to the number of queries or time, and we have only compared
it with the best currently know classical attack. But we can already conclude that this quantization gives
better gains in time and time-space product than the optimal algorithm for 2-encryption.
This seems to indicate that successive encryptions is less resistant against quantum attacks than it is
against classical ones. This intuition could be confirmed by proving lower bounds on quantum attacks,
eventually allowing to consider the most time-efficient attacks in both cases. We have not been able to
answer this question for 4-encryption as we did for 2-encryption. Of course, one possibility is that the
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dissection algorithm is not optimal, but improving it is a challenging question in classical cryptography.
Proving a quantum lower bound or improving the classical upper bounds would both give more insight on
security amplification.
Another crucial element that misses in our analysis is a study of the r-encryption case. Classically, the
dissection algorithm that we have discussed can be generalized iteratively applied, leading to attacks on
r-encryption for arbitrary values of r. In our case, there is a barrier that prevents the scaling of our results.
The composition theorem derived from the generalized adversary method, or the quantum-walk framework
both introduce multiplicative factors, and it seems harder to understand how the complexity grows as a
function of r.
Our work can be understood as a proof of principle that quantum complexity and algorithms theory has
developed powerful tools to tackle important questions in cryptography and post-quantum cryptography.
Maybe a better use of these tools can lead to improving and extending the results presented here. Or maybe
these tools need to be sharpened in order to apply to specific cryptographic situations. In both cases, we hope
that our work will motivate further interactions between classical cryptographers and quantum computer
scientists. Such interactions seem crucial to establish a serious approach to post-quantum cryptography. In
particular, iterating block ciphers is not a very good procedure to amplify security against classical adversary.
We hope that the techniques presented here will be applied to more efficient cryptographic procedures in
the future.
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A Quantum query complexity
The model
In the quantum query complexity model, the goal is to compute some function F : S → T on input x. For
simplicity, we assume in this short presentation that S ⊆ {0, 1}n. The input is given as a black-box and
accessed through queries. A classical query ℓ to the input x returns xℓ.
In the quantum setting, the algorithm is executed on an architecture with three quantum registers: an
input register I, a query register Q and a working register W . The state of the quantum computer when
the algorithm starts is |x〉I |0, 0〉Q|0〉W . There are several equivalent formalism to model quantum queries.
Without loss of generality, we consider a quantum query as an operator
O : |x〉I |i, y〉Q 7−→ |x〉I |i, y + xi mod 2〉Q.
Considering non-boolean inputs is equivalent, up to logarithmic factors.
The quantum algorithm supposed to compute f alternates between quantum query operations Oi and
work operations that are unitaries Ui acting on the query register and the working register. After t queries
to the input, the state of the quantum computer is UtOtUt−1 . . . O2U1O1|x〉I |0, 0〉Q|0〉W .
We assume that the working register contains log |T | qubits to encode the value f(x). The last step of
the algorithm is then to measure these qubits and output the value that is obtained. Finally, an immediate
corollary of the model is that the time complexity of f is at least equal to the query complexity of the
algorithm. The generalized adversary method can be used to prove a lower bound on query complexity,
which in turn bounds the time complexity.
Quantum walks
We first review the paradigm of quantum walks. We use this tool to design an attack against 4-encryption.
More precisely, we use it to combine an exhaustive search with a collision finding algorithm. The framework
of quantum walks allows to easily analyze the ressources used by the algorithm.
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A search algorithm aims to find a marked element in a finite set U . Classically, it can be seen as a walk
on a graph whose nodes are indexed by subsets of elements of U . Each step of the algorithm consists in
walking from one node to another. The algorithm can also maintain a data structure that is updated at
each step. After each move, the algorithm checks if the node contains a marked element. The algorithm
terminates when a marked element is found.
Magniez, Nayak, Roland and Santha have designed a generic theorem in order to quantize search al-
gorithms expressed as random walks. The cost of the resulting quantum algorithm can be written as a
function of S, U and C. These are the cost of setting up the quantum register in a state that corresponds to
the stationary distribution, moving unitarily from one node to an adjacent node, and checking if a node is
marked, respectively.
Theorem 5. [MNRS11] Let P be an ergodic and reversible Markov chain with eignvalue gap δ, and let
ε > 0 be a lower bound on the probability that an element chosen from the stationary distribution of P is
marked, whenever the set of marked element is non-empty. Then, there exists a quantum algorithm which
finds, with high probability, a marked element if there is any at cost of order S+ 1√
ε
( 1√
δ
U+ C).
Grover’s algorithm can be seen as a trivial application of Theorem 5 (see also [San08]). The underlying
graph is the complete graph whose nodes are indexed by elements of U , with no data structure. In our case
however, the checking procedure is very different because it implies multiple queries to the input, and we
use Theorem 5 to design our attack.
The generalized adversary method
We use the generalized adversary method to prove a lower bound on the problem KE2. The intuition of the
method is to consider pairs of inputs leading to different outputs. Each pair is given a weight2 quantifying
how difficult it is to distinguish them. The key point of the method is then to measure the progress made by
a single quantum query to distinguish paris of inputs. This intuition can be formalized in several different
ways. We use the spectral version, an elegant algebraic formalization of the previous intuition [HLSˇ07].
Definition 5. Fix a function F : S → T , with S ⊆ {0, 1}n. A symmetric matrix Γ : S × S → R is an
adversary matrix for F provided Γ[x, y] = 0 whenever F (x) = F (y). Let ∆ℓ[x, y] = 1 if xℓ 6= yℓ and 0
otherwise. The adversary bound of F using Γ is
ADV
±(F ; Γ) = min
ℓ
‖Γ‖
‖Γ •∆ℓ‖ ,
where • denotes entrywise (or Hadamard) product, and ‖A‖ denotes the spectral norm of A. The adversary
bound ADV±(F ) is the maximum, over all adversary matrices Γ for F , of ADV±(F ; Γ).
Høyer, Lee and Sˇpalek introduced the generalized adversary method and proved that the adversary value
is a lower bound on quantum query complexity [HLSˇ07]. In our proof, we need the fact that the adversary
bound characterizes quantum query complexity, up to a constant factor. Our proof starts by considering
an adversary matrix for the problem CF such that the adversary bound is equal to the quantum query
complexity. The fact that the generalized adversary method is tight was proven by Lee, Mittal, Reichardt,
Sˇpalek and Szegedy.
Theorem 6. [LMR+11] Fix a function F : S → T . The bounded-error quantum query complexity of F is
characterized by the general adversary bound:
Q(f) = Θ(ADV±(F )).
2The original method uses probability distribution, the generalized method allows for negative weights as well.
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